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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BRYCE C. REYNOLDS and
LaDONNA REYNOLDS, his wife,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
Case No. 15715
STEWART VAN WAGONER,
Defendant.
RICHLAND, INC. ,
Plaintiff in Intervention-Respondent,
vs.
BRYCE c. REYNOLDS and
LaDONNA REYNOLDS, his wife;
and SALT LAKE COUNTY,
Defendants in Intervention-Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff in
land, Inc.

intervention and respondent, Rich-

(hereafter "Richland"), contract purchaser from

defendant Bryce C. Reynolds, individually and as debtor in
possession and trustee in bankruptcy of Bryce C. Reynolds,
debtor, and Anna LaDonna Reynolds, his wife (hereafter
"Reynolds"), of certain property under a Uniform Real Estate
Contract claims that the payment of the taxes, interest and
Penalties by Reynolds at a tax sale constitutes an election
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 2 by Reynolds under paragraph 14 of the Uniform Real Estate
Contract to pay the taxes and to receive reimbursement from
Richland.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The motion for summary jugment of Richland was
granted, the District Court ruling that Reynolds was entitled to sums paid to Salt Lake County for the tax deed,
together with interest, and Richland, having tendered payment for sums paid by Reynolds, was entitled to receive all
interest acquired by Reynolds in the tax sale of the property.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent Richland asks that the judgment of the
trial court be affirmed and that Richland be awarded its
attorney's fees on appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Richland does not disagree with the Statement of
Facts insofar as set forth in Appellants' Brief; however,
the Statement of Facts as contained therein is incomplete
and the following is submitted to supplement the Statement
of Facts in Appellants' Brief.
On August 23, 1963, Bryce

c.

Reynolds, individ-

ually and as debtor in proceedings for an arrangement
before the Bankruptcy Court in the United States District
Court for the District of Utah, Central Division, entered
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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into a stipulation with Motor Lease, Inc., a secured creditor, regarding the real property in question in this matter
and other matters in issue before the Bankruptcy Court (see
Answer to Interrogatory No. 36, R.213, and R.120-154).

The

stipulation was subject to the approval of the Bankruptcy
Court.
Thereafter, Reynolds executed and delivered an
escrow agreement dated September 27, 1963 (see Answers to
Interrogatories Nos. 7 and 8, R.209 and R.110-15).

The

documents submitted to the escrow agent to be held by it and
disposed of as provided in the escrow agreement included a
Quit-Claim Deed, Uniform Real Estate Contract, Assignment,
and Release of Mortgages (see Answers to Interrogatories
Nos. 3-6 and 9-13, R.209-10, R.106-9, R.116-19).
in Appellants' Brief:

As stated

"All of the instruments were autho-

rized by the Bankruptcy Court"

(Appellants' Brief, p.3).

On the 12th day of January, 1965, Bryce C. Reynolds, debtor, and his attorney in the matter of Bryce C.
Reynolds, dba Reynolds Sand & Gravel Company, debtor, in the
United States District Court for the District of Utah,
Central Division, petitioned the Referee in Bankruptcy to
set aside the stipulation between Bryce C. Reynolds and
Motor Lease, Inc.

(see Answers to Interrogatories Nos. 37

and 38, R.213-14, and R.155-59).
On July 6, 1965, an order was entered in the

c.
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Company, debtor, in the United States District Court for the
District of Utah, denying the petition to set aside the
stipulation (see Answers to Interrogatories Nos.

39 and 40,

R.214 and R.158-59).
The escrow agreement provides in part that if
Richland fails to make the payments when due, or fails to
perform any other term or condition of the Uniform Real
Estate Contract, upon written demand to the escrow agent
"said deeds, abstracts, real estate contract and
then held by [the escrow agent]
nolds]"

(R.111-12).

assignme~

shall be delivered to [Rey-

If Richland made the payments when due

and performed the other terms of the Uniform Real Estate
Contract, the escrow agent was to deliver the documents to
Richland.
The Uniform Real Estate Contract (R.106-8) provides for a purchase price of $127,966.44, payable at the
rate of $800 per month.

Paragraph 14 of

~he

contract pro-

vides:
In the event the Buyer shall default
in the payment of any special or general
taxes, assessments or insurance premiums
as herein provided, the Seller may, at
his option, pay said taxes, assessments
and insurance premiums or either of them,
and if Seller elects so to do, then Buyer
agrees to repay the Seller upon demand,
all such sums so advanced and paid by him,
together with interest thereon from the
date of payment of said SUI~3 at the rate
of three-fourths of one percent per month
until paid.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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paragraph 21 of the contract provides:
The Buyer and Seller each agree that
should they default in any of the covenants or agreements contained herein, that
the defaulting party shall pay all costs
and expenses, including a reasonable
attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue
from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the premises covered
hereby or in pursuing any remedy provided
hereunder or by the statutes of the state
of Utah, whether such remedy is pursued
by filing a suit or otherwise.
The Assignment (R.109) assigned to Motor Lease,
Inc. all sums due under the Uniform Real Estate Contract.
However, it specifically provided that the contract was not
assigned, but that the assignors reserved all of the rights
and privileges and retained all duties and obligations they
may have under the contract.
In 1963, when the stipulation was entered into,
the property which is the subject of the Uniform Real Estate
Contract was subject to loans or obligations against the
property in favor of Prudential Federal Savings & Loan
Association and The Lockhart Company (see Contract, •6,

R.106-8).

Richland paid the obligations until paid in full,

which payments included the amounts for property taxes until
the end of 1972.

Prudential received the tax notices until

the obligation was paid in full in 1972.

Thereafter, Rich-

land did not receive notice of the taxes or the amounts
thereof (see Answers to Interrogatories Nos. 5 and 6, R.92).
On May 26, 1976, Reynolds paid the taxes and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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- 6 deed.

On September 24, 1976, Reynolds filed their complaint

in unlawful detainer against Richland's lessee (R.2,3).

on

October 14, 1976, Richland served its Motion for Intervention on the parties (R.4,5).

The motion was granted and on

November 2, 1976, Richland filed its complaint in intervention (R.19-23) and deposited the amount paid by Reynolds for
the taxes and penalties, together with interest (see •6 of
Complaint in Intervention, R.21, and R.28 and 29).
Richland has made the payments due under the real
estate contract and has performed the other conditions of
the contract (see Answer to Interrogatory No. 2(e), R.90).
The district court's memorandum decision is quoted
at length in Appellants' Brief.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE CONTRACTS ENTERED
INTO BETWEEN RICHLAND AND REYNOLDS WERE ABANDONED
BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT.
In bankruptcy proceedings in the United States

District Court for the Central District of Utah, Bryce C.
Reynolds, as an individual and as debtor in possesion, and
Anna LaDonna Reynolds, his wife, entered into a stipulation
with Motor Lease, Inc., a secured creditor (R.120-54).
stipulation is dated August 23, 1963.

The

The parties to the

stipulation structured the transaction as a resolution of
certain issues in the bankruptcy proceeding, subject to the
approval of the Bankruptcy Court.

Subsequently, on Janu-

ary 12, 1965, Reynolds attempted to set aside the stipula-
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The Referee in Bankruptcy denied the petition

to set aside the stipulation (R.158-9).
Richland is current in its payments under the real
estate contract and has otherwise performed its obligations
thereunder.

Richland would not continue to make payments

under the contract if it had been abandoned.
Reynolds assert that the contract has been abandoned by the parties.

However, there is. no evidence of

abandonment and, on the contrary, the evidence is that the
contract has not been abandoned.

The rule apparently relied

upon by Reynolds is contained in 17A C.J.S., Contract, §412:
Rights acquired under a contract may be
abandoned or relinquished by agreement,
conduct, or by a contract clearly indicating such purpose.
To constitute an
abandonment of rights an actual intent
to abandon must exist.
Such intent may
be inferred from the conduct of the parties.
An abandonment of rights does not occur
unless the promissee, with a full knowledge of all the material facts, does or
bears the doing of something inconsistent
with the right or with an intention to
rely on it . . . .
(Footnotes omitted.)
The facts are undisputed that the parties entered
into a stipulation in the Bankruptcy Court, that as a result

of the stipulation the various contracts among the parties
were entered into and placed with the escrow agent, the
Bankcuptcy Court refused to set aside the stipulation among
the parties, and Richland is current in its payments under
the real estate contract.

Reynolds appear to seek some

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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relief on the basis that Reynolds have been abandoned as a
party to the contract, not that the contract itself has

be~

abandoned.
Although it may be said that Reynolds had no
regular or frequent responsibilities under the contracts, it
cannot be said that Reynolds had no rights, duties or responsibilities thereunder.

Furthermore, when an escrow is

established, one or more parties to the escrow may have no
affirmative requirements thereafter, but may merely be
entitled to await the other party's performance, at which
time the escrow agent performs the responsibilities of one
or more parties.

In Morris v. Clark, 100 Utah 252, 112 P.2d

153 (1941), cert. den'd 314 U.S. 584, the plaintiff asserted
that the death of a principal to an escrow agreement revoked
the escrow agent's authority.

In holding otherwise, this

Court quoted the correct rule as follows:
·~ntil

the escrow contract has been made,
the depositary has no rights or authority
enforceable at law, but when it has been
made and the instrument deposited, he becomes the agent of both parties; and the
death of a party prior to the performance
of the condition, does not affect the
depositary's obligation to perform the
duties imposed upon him by the escrow
contract. When the condition upon which
the instrument is to take effect is performed, the depositary becomes a mere
agent or trustee of the grantee and his
possession is equivalent to possession
by the grantee."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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- 9 In Doxey-Layton v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902
1976), this Court stated:

(Utah,

"A deed in escrow, under a condi-

tional sales contract, is effective as a conveyance after
performance of the contract obligations, and upon delivery
by the depositary."

This requires the continued validity of

the contract until completion of the escrow.
In the present case, the escrow agreement provides
that in the event Richland does not make the payments under
the contract or does not comply with other provisions of the
contract, Reynolds may demand the return of the documents.
Further, Reynolds retained all rights in the contract, but
merely assigned to Motor Lease, Inc., Reynolds' secured
creditor, the proceeds to be paid by Richland under the real
estate contract.
The stipulation approved by the Bankruptcy Court
and the contracts among the parties established a contractual relationship.

Reynolds here seek to have this court

set aside the entire purpose and effect of the contract, as
well as the contract itself.

Reynolds assert that since the

contract relieves them of any additional responsibilities
and that it could be completed without any further act on
their part, that Reynolds ought to be deemed, as a matter of
law, to have been abandoned as parties to the contract.
In King v. Firm, 3 U.2d 419, 285 P.2d 1114 (1955),
the Court, referring to 12 Arn.Jur., Contracts, §442, analyzedby what
is required
for the
abandonment
a contract.
Sponsored
the S.J. Quinney
Law Library. Funding
for digitization
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The Court stated:

- 10 We agree that the evidence is conclusive
that none of the parties to the second
note and mortgage considered them to be
valid and subsisting instruments.
King by releasing the first mortgage and
writing thereon that the sum paid included
interest and payment of an attorney's fee
for "unused papers" acted in a manner inconsistent with the existence of any rights
under the second note and mortgage and
thereby showed that he had abandoned any
such rights which he may have had, and
certainly the other parties acquiesced
in this.
King properly requires evidence of mutual agreement of
abandonment or conduct clearly indicating such purpose.
The record is totally devoid of any evidence of
any nature whatsoever that Richland abandoned the contract
by its agreement or by its conduct.
wise.

The evidence is other-

In absence of some evidence raising the issue of

abandonment, the trial court acted properly in granting the
motion for summary judgment.
The ruling of the Bankruptcy Court is res judicata
of the validity of the stipulation and contracts among the
parties.

Reynolds attempted to have the stipulation set

aside in the Bankruptcy Court.

They should not be allowed

to approach another forum in order to obtain a different
result.

As stated by this Court in Wheadon v. Pearson, 14

U.2d 45, 376 P.2d 946 (1962):

Policy would seem to indicate that
when a plaintiff has once attempted to
obtain his entire relief, based upon his
entire claim, then the matter should be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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laid at rest.
He should be denied a
second attempt at substantially the same
objective under a different guise.
(Footnote omitted.)
see also East Mill Creek Water Co. v. Salt Lake City, 108
Utah 315, 159 P. 2d 863 (1945).
POINT II. THE ESCROW AGREEMENT AND REAL ESTATE CONTRACT
REMAIN IN EFFECT EVEN IF THE INTERESTS THEREUNDER
ARE CONVERTED BY THE THEORY OF EQUITABLE CONVERSION.
Reynolds assert the theory of equitable conversion
affords them relief.

The following is a general description

of the theory of equitable conversions:
Equitable conversion is that constructive
alteration in the nature or character of
property whereby, in equity, real estate
is for certain purposes considered as personalty, or whereby personalty, for similar considerations, is regarded as real
estate, and in either instance, it is deemed
to be transmissable and descendable in its
converted form.
(Footnote omitted.)
27
Am.Jur.2d, Equitable Conversion, §1.
The application and the limitations of the doctrine of
equitable estoppel are explained in 27 Am.Jur.2d, Equitable
Conversion, §3:
The application of the doctrine of equitable conversion depends somewhat on
the circumstances under which it is invoked, since the doctrine is not a fixed
rule of law, but proceeds on equitable
principles which take into account the
result to be accomplished. The doctrine
is most frequently applied in solving
questions concerning the validity and
execution of trusts, the legal character
of the interests of the beneficiaries,
the devolution of property as between
real and personal representatives, and
Sponsored by the S.J. for
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- 12 conversion of property is not favored in
law, however, and the doctrine does not
exist as a matter of right.
It is to be
invoked only when required by necessity
and justice. And even where required the
conversion must be kept within the limits
of actual necessity.
The application of
the doctrine is always withheld where its
effect would be contrary to the intention
of the testator, settlor, or contracting
parties. Moreover, the doctrine will never
be employed for the purpose of circumventing
public policy, or to sustain a fraud or a
wrongful act.
Nor, it has been held, will
the doctrine be extended so as to effect a
conversion as to persons whose claims or
rights to the property are purely incidental, and not at all connected with its
devolution or transfer from the owner or
through the instrument.
(Emphasis added;
footnotes omitted.)
The thrust of Reynolds' argument appears to be
that if the theory of equitable conversion applies to the
real estate contract, thus converting the interest of the
vendor to personalty or the right to receive the payments
from the vendee, Reynolds cease to be parties to the contract or that Reynolds have no further rights, responsibilities or obligations with respect to the contract.
Even if the theory of equitable conversion is
applicable to the real estate contract, it does not follow
that the effect of application of the theory of equitable
conversion is as claimed by Reynolds, that of eliminating
Reynolds as a party to the contract or absolving Reynolds of
any rights, responsibilities or obligations thereunder.
Although Allred v. Allred, 15 U.2d 396, 393 P.2d 791 (196

41
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- 13 and In re Estate of Willson, 28 U.2d 197, 499 P.2d 1298
(1972), both hold, under the facts before the Court in each
case, that the interest of the vendor of real property under
an enforceable executory contract is converted to personalty,
neither case indicates in any manner that the contractual
relationships established by the contracts are altered.

In

Allred, the Court stated:
It is not contended that the vendors did
not have an enforceable contract upon
which they could have sued for specific
performance in the event the vendees
should have refused to perform their
part of the agreement.
Similarly, if Richland fails to make the payments required
by the real estate contract or fails to perform other re-

quirernents of the contract, Reynolds remain entitled to all
of the remedies provided by the real estate contract or
provided by law.

To accept Reynolds' argument would be to

negate the terms and provisions of the real estate contract
merely because the nature of the vendor's rights thereunder
are converted from realty to personalty.
Stipulations and settlements are favored and are
not to be set aside lightly.

This Court has been reluctant

to set aside stipulations of parties.

See Buzianas v. Bene-

ficial Homes, Inc., 550 P.2d 174 (Utah, 1976); Klein v. Klein,
544 P.2d 766 (Utah, 1975); United Factors v. T. C. Associates,
~,

445 P.2d 766, 21 U.2d 351 (1968); and Johnson v. Peoples

Unance & Thrift Co., 2 U.2d 246, 272 P.2d 171 (1954).

In
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- 14 Johnson, the parties to a quiet title action entered into a
stipulation before the Court at a pretrial conference for
the resolution of the dispute.

The stipulation provided

that the parties would exchange quit-claim deeds to clear
title to the property actually within each party's fence
lines and provided that a new contract would be executed to
adjust the price the buyer would pay because of a reduction
in the property to be acquired.

The parties failed to

perform the terms of the stipulation.

The trial court

entered judgment embodying the terms of the stipulation.

In

response to the plaintiff's appeal from the judgment, this
Court stated:
The plaintiffs argue that it was never contemplated or agreed by the parties that the
stipulations would be the basis for any judgment except a judgment dismissing the case.
They refer us to the statement made by the
court at the close of the pretrial conference,
to which all parties assented, viz., that
he would hold the case until the parties
had made their conveyances and that he
would then dismiss the case upon their
joining in a petition to that effect. We
agree with the plaintiffs that obviously
such was the intention of the parties
and the court at that time.
However, when
the parties failed to perform in accordance
with the stipulations, the court was not
powerless to require them to abide by their
agreement.
It would indeed be a serious
reflection upon our system of jurisprudence
if parties could stipulate an agreement of
settlement but refuse with impunity from
performing. Courts are not impotent when
one or more parties to a stipulation becomes
recalcitrant.
. . . We think the trial
court took the proper course when he entered
judgment embodying the terms of the stipulation.
(Emphasis added.)
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- 15 Reynolds have suffered no injury.

Richland ten-

dered the amount Reynolds paid for taxes and penalties,
together with applicable interest.

This Court should not

set aside the stipulation approved by the Bankruptcy Court
or take any action which would have similar effect.
POINT III.REYNOLDS' PAYMENT OF TAXES ENTITLES REYNOLDS TO
REIMBURSEMENT FROM RICHLAND.
Paragraph 14 of the real estate contract provides
that Reynolds, as Seller, at Seller's option, may pay the
special or general taxes "and if Seller elects so to do,
then Buyer agrees to repay the Seller upon demand, all such
sums so advanced and paid by him, together with interest
thereon .... "

In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Hart, 25 U.2d

244, 480 P.2d 131 (1971), this Court held that the seller
was entitled to reimbursement for its payment of property
taxes.

This Court so held even though upon the buyer's

request, the seller gave buyer a payoff figure, which was
paid by buyer, and a special warranty deed was issued.

The

payoff amount given by the seller and paid by the buyer did
not include the real estate taxes, which the seller had
paid.

The buyer asserted, under such circumstances, accord

and satisfaction.

The Court held that the evidence was not

sufficient to establish an agreement that the parties would
accept a substitute performance, but "on the contrary, both
parties were rendering performance strictly in accordance
withby the
of Library.
the Funding
contract."
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- 16 Richland tendered the amount of taxes and penalties, together with applicable interest.

The Court should

affirm the trial court and award such amount to Reynolds.
POINT IV. RICHLAND SHOULD BE AWARDED ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES ON
APPEAL.
The real estate contract provides:
21.
The Buyer and Seller each agree
that should they default in any of the covenants or agreements contained herein, that
the defaulting party shall pay all costs
and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from
enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining
possession of the premises covered hereby,
or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder
or by the statutes of the State of Utah,
whether such remedy is pursued by filing
a suit or otherwise.
Reynolds have refused to accept the tender of
Richland of the monies paid for taxes upon the real property.

Richland submits that under all the circumstances

and in view of Reynolds' action, Richland is entitled to
attorney's fees as awarded at the trial court and on appeal.
Attorney's fees on appeal are discretionary with the Supreme
Court.

Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate and Investment Co., l

U.2d 121, 279 P.2d 709 (1955); see also Bates v. Bates, 560
P.2d 706 (1977).

Since responding to Reynolds' appeal has

been necessary in enforcing the real estate contract, Richland submits that attorney's fees on appeal are proper.
Attorney's fees on appeal should be granted in such amount
to be determined by the trial court upon proper evidence.
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- 17 CONCLUSION
There is no evidence that Richland abandoned the
contract by its agreement or by its conduct; the evidence is
that the contract has been honored by Richland, which has
paid the amounts required by the contract.

The Bankruptcy

court has previously declined to allow the contract to be
set aside, and that ruling is res judicata of Reynolds'
claim now.
The contract remains in effect even if certain
interests thereunder are converted by the theory of equitable conversion; the contractual relationships between the
parties remain unaffected.
Richland asks this Court affirm the judgment of
the trial court and to award it attorney's fees on appeal.
DATED this 10th day of July, 1978.
Respectfully submitted,
MOYLE & DRAPER

By~---..,~~---::---:-....,-,~~~~~~-

Wayne G. Petty
Attorneys for Richland, Inc.
600 Deseret Plaza
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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